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1.  Introduction
1.1 Context 
Mozambique is a multiparty democracy located in the 
southern African region. With abundant natural resources 
its agricultural potential is greatly unexplored (in 2004, 
only 9% of arable land was cultivated) and, with a few 
exceptions, the sector has broadly underperformed since 
Independence. Low levels of agricultural productivity 
and rural incomes (the latest household survey indicates 
rural poverty in on the rise) result from a combination 
of factors, including: two decades of civil war with 
devastating effects across rural areas; low levels of 
agricultural research and technology uptake; 
underdevelopment of markets for agricultural inputs and 
outputs; insufficient private investment due to pervasive 
market failures; weak governance capacity and ineffective 
public spending. Adding to these, this paper argues that 
politics, the nature of the “political settlement” and 
configuration of the political system in particular, are 
also an explanation for poor performance and for failure 
to address some of the existing contraints. Politically-
driven policies adopted by the ruling elites have generally 
discriminated against the majority of agricultural 
producers, who continue to be poor, vulnerable and 
dependent from handouts from government, donors or 
NGOs. 
1.2  Argument 
The paper analyses the changing configuration of the 
political system since the Rome Peace Agreement of 
1992. It discusses how the “political settlement” underlying 
the Peace Agreement and the outcomes of multiparty 
elections thereafter have shaped governance, including 
policy-making concerning the agriculture sector and the 
rural economy. The paper argues that private interests 
and electoral objectives have been important drivers of 
policy decisions taken by the governing elites concerning 
the agriculture sector and local governance, with 
precedence over donor influence. By contrasting the 
political choices and governance approaches adopted 
by the two different presidential administrations in office 
since the first multiparty elections were held in 1994, it 
is argued that one (led by Joaquim Chissano) is marked 
by features of “neopatrimonialism”, whereas the other 
(led by Armando Guebuza) is showing signs of electoral 
“populism”. The former is characterised by significant rent 
distribution by the governing elite to a narrow 
“selectorate”. The latter is manifested by a paternalistic 
and politically mobilising discourse emanating directly 
from the President and appealing to the broader 
electorate, particularly the rural population of the central 
and Northern region of the country, who has been 
traditionally opposed to the ruling party.
1.3  The broader study, conceptual 
framework and research methods
The theoretical concepts framing the analysis are 
derived from a conceptual framework developed for the 
broader research project on the political economy of 
agricultural policy in Africa this case-study contributes 
to. The broader project aims to analyse how domestic 
politics determine agricultural policy-making and its 
outcomes by contrasting political systems across the 
African continent. Its underlying assumption is that 
political systems vary markedly across Africa and that 
this should lead, more or less systematically, to differences 
in the design and implementation of agricultural policy, 
given the importance of the agricultural sector to so 
many people in these countries.
The conceptual framework highlights the importance 
of at least three concepts in explaining the mechanics 
of political systems and differences across countries.  One 
is the concept of “political settlement”, that is, the implicit 
arrangement (informal or formalised, through for 
example a Constitution) between elites on how to govern 
the country so as to avoid the threat of civil conflict 
(Migdal, 1988). It is therefore the result of bargaining 
between the elites, not only the elite in government, but 
all those elite groups with sufficient power to pose a 
threat. The other is the concept of “selectorate”, which is 
the subset of the electorate that actually decides the 
outcomes of elections, i.e. those with power/influence 
to decide the direction of votes (de Mesquita, 2009). In 
mature democracies the selectorate corresponds to a 
large proportion of the electorate. Where the selectorate 
is narrow the incentive for the ruling party/coalition to 
deliver public goods (which benefit the whole population) 
is limited and there will be incentives to deliver private 
goods that benefit exclusively the selectorate. Regional 
power brokers may correspond to the selectorate. The 
third is that of “neo-patrimonialism” which translates the 
occurrence of a legal-rational logic juxtaposed with a 
patrimonial logic within African states (Van de Walle 
2001). The ruling elites use state mechanisms and 
resources to secure loyalty of clients.
Drawing on these notions, the conceptual framework 
proposes four stylised types of political systems, depicted 
Table 1. Typology of political systems in Africa.
Transformational Transfers
Narrow(er) selectorate 
(may be linked to social or 
political control)
Developmental patrimonialism Traditional (“big man” or party)
clientelism
Wide(r) selectorate Programmatic politics Populism
Source: Poulton (2011) “Understanding the Political Economy of Agricultural Policy Making in Africa: a Conceptual 
Framework”, FAC working paper.
“Agriculture is an 
activity practiced 
by poor people 
and  used to 
educate children 
and take them out 
of the field.”
Sussundenga 
Peasant
Working Paper 034 www.future-agricultures.org3
in Table 1. Populism, for example, results from competition 
within the elites, forcing one of the competing elite 
groups to appeal to the wider electorate to weaken 
opposing elite forces.
The analysis on Mozambique’s political economy of 
agriculture is one of eight case-studies undertaken under 
this broad framework.1  It draws on reviews of relevant 
academic literature and media sources, particularly 
newspapers, as well as semi-structured interviews with 
a selection of 17 key informants from government, 
donors, the private sector and civil society, including 
academic researchers and experts.  Data collection took 
place in Maputo, between  March and  June of 2011.
1.4 Structure of the paper
The paper is structured into 5 sections, including this 
introduction. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
context, which includes a description of Mozambican 
agriculture and its performance and of the main stages 
of agricultural policy. Section 3 describes the configuration 
of the political system shaped by the political settlement 
underlying the Peace Agreement and the four multiparty 
elections held since the end of the war. Section 4 discusses 
the political dimensions of agricultural governance, 
looking not only at the formulation and implementation 
of policies targeting directly the agricultural sector but 
also at reforms concerning local administration with a 
bear on agricultural governance and investments. Section 
5 concludes and raises issues for further investigation.
2.  Background
2.1 General Background
Mozambique is a large country in southern Africa with 
a population of approximately 22 million inhabitants 
(according to the NSI, 2007). Despite its wealth of natural 
resources and agricultural potential, Mozambique is still 
part of the 20 poorest countries in the world2. The long 
civil war that followed independence in 1975 had 
devastating consequences on the economy and 
society.
Recently, the country has been considered by 
international agencies as one of the success stories in 
contemporary Africa.3 This is not only because of political 
stability but also because of positive macroeconomic 
performance. Over the last ten years, Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) has registered an average growth of 8% 
per year. However, in 2010, the Human Development 
Index was still very low, and the country lingered at 
position 165 out of a ranking of 169 countries (UNDP, 
2010).
Over the last decade, economic growth has been 
largely a result of investments in so-called mega-projects, 
namely: aluminium smelting by Mozal, the investments 
of South African oil company SASOL and the Moma heavy 
sands project. Investment in these three projects has
accounted for over 55% of total private investment made 
during the past 10 years and their combined production 
accounts for almost 70% of the gross industrial production 
of Mozambique (Castel-Branco, 2008). In 2006, Mozal’s 
gross production value (about 2 billion U.S. dollars) was 
higher than the National State Budget and the total 
exports of these projects accounted for nearly three-
quarters of total national exports (Castel-Branco, 
2008).
However, studies show that the contribution of these 
mega-projects to poverty reduction is rather limited (Burr 
et al, 2011; Castel-Branco, 2010). Between 1997 and 2002, 
the poverty rate fell from 69.4% to 54.1%. Between 2002 
and 2009, however, no significant advances were made 
on this area, since the percentage of poor people 
increased by 0.6% to 54.7%, an increase more denounced 
in rural areas (MPD, 2010).
2.2 Characterization of the agricultural 
sector and its performance
In this section the main characteristics of the 
agricultural sector in Mozambique are analyzed and 
political and institutional factors relevant to its 
performance is presented. For this purpose, the potential 
of the sector is presented first, its weight in the national 
economy and the constraints that prevented the sector 
from becoming the engine of the development alluded 
to by the political elites in power.
Physically, Mozambique is generously endowed with 
land and water for agricultural purposes. There are about 
36 million hectares of arable land (MADER, 2004), which 
represents a huge agricultural potential. The peasant 
family sector occupies about 3.2 million hectares and is 
geographically dispersed and heterogeneous from a 
cultural, technical and economic point of view (MINAG, 
2007). These families farm in plots of land with an average 
size of 1.1 hectares (ASP, 2005). In 2010, only 14% 
(equivalent to 4,7 million hectares) of arable land was 
farmed (SNV, 2010). From the 3.3 million hectares of 
arable land, only 1.8% were irrigated4. Until the 2008/2009 
agricultural campaign, food crops took about 70% of 
cultivated area and the remaining 30% were occupied 
by agricultural crops meant for exportation such as sugar, 
cotton, tea and sisal (Falcão & Egas, 2008)
There are significant discrepancies in terms of 
production, marketing and productivity levels across 
provinces and districts due to agro-ecological 
accessibilities and conditions. Food crop production 
across provinces in the seasons 2008 to 2010 illustrates 
regional unbalances (Table 2).
According to official data, basic food crop production 
in the agrarian sector, which accounts for 90% of the 
total agricultural production (especially maize, sorghum, 
millet, cassava and sweet potato), has remained stable 
over the last three decades (MADER 2004; MINAG, 2010). 
However, Mozambique remains a net importer of 
agricultural products and rural poverty has increased. It 
is argued that rural poverty is rooted in a limited 
development of both agriculture and markets (TIA, 2002). 
Agriculture currently employs about 80% of the workforce 
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(90% of the female and 70% of the male workforces) and 
accounts for 80% of family sector income, thus being 
instrumental to poverty reduction. However, the 
agricultural potential does not translate into revenue 
generation and rural jobs creation in any tangible way 
(TIA, 2002). The prices of agricultural commodities and 
wages in rural areas are unfavourable and are, on average, 
30% lower than salaries paid in other sectors of the 
economy (Mosca, 2011). Since its independence, public 
and private investment in the smallholder sector has 
been weak, and the peasantry continues to sell their 
products to state monopolies while providing cheap 
labour to large monocultures plantations (Wuyts, 2001). 
The smallholder dominated agricultural sector has 
therefore displayed growth rates far below its potential 
and, with few exceptions, productivity levels remain 
below levels achieved in the pre-Independence period 
(Figure 1).
Nevertheless, if one looks at the sector’s performance 
as a whole, agricultural production has, between 2001 
and 2007, increased by over 8%, with the exception of 
2005 when production suffered a considerable slump. 
The drop in agricultural production was caused by 
drought, cyclones and floods that had a tremendous 
negative impact in the country (Figure 2). 
This growth in the sector as a whole is mainly the result 
of the expansion of farmed land and not increasing 
agricultural productivity. Furthermore, it is the commercial 
Table 2. Major food crops production by province
Province Corn (ha) Sorghum (ha) Pearl millet (ha) Rice
2008/09 2009/10 % 2008/9 2009/10 % 2008/09 2009/10 % 2008/09 2009/10 %
Cabo Delg 112 145 128 133 14.3 87 469 92 066 5.3 5 233 5 330 1.8 17 138 17 633 2.9
Niassa 174 064 198 246 13.9 47 905 49 690 3.7 2 559 2 608 1.9 5 704 5 818 2.0
Nampula 142 629 154 312 8.2 151 584 154 677 2.0 9 659 9 866 2.2 40 849 42 050 2.9
Norte 428 838 480 692 12.1 286 958 296 434 3.3 17 451 17 804 2.0 63 691 65 501 2.8
Zambezia 247 256 273 234 10.5 85 754 91 311 6.4 9 456 9 647 2.0 96 481 100 070 3.7
Tete 208 600 230 957 10.7 72 492 72 722 0.3 34 125 34 922 2.3 329 331 0.5
Manica 255 379 267 974 4.9 63 798 68 462 7.3 16 686 17 143 2.7 1 108 1 134 2.4
Sofala 109 673 113 474 3.5 70 896 76 414 7.8 14 076 14 575 3.5 36 430 37 200 2.1
Centro 820 908 885 639 7.9 292 940 308 909 5.4 74 343 76 287 2.6 134 347 138 735 3.3
Inhambane 125 279 127 414 1.7 26 827 28 950 7.9 12 679 13 399 5.7 4 485 4 525 0.9
Gaza 159 520 164 606 3.2 3 666 3 872 5.6 1 352 1 490 10.2 12 782 15 075 17.9
Maputo 77 352 79 692 3.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 2 744 2 756 0.4
Sul 362 152 371 711 2.6 30 493 32 822 7.6 14 031 14 889 6.1 20 011 22 357 11.7
Total
Domestic
1.611 898 1 738 042 7.8 610 391 638 165 4.5 105 825 108 980 2.9 218 050 226 593 3.9
Source: MINAG/DNSA/DCAP/DPA, 2010.
Source: Faostat, 2009. 
Figure 2. Agricultural sector growth rates, 2001- 2007
Figure 3. Yield per hectare of selected food crops, 
1961- 2009
Source: Faostat
Source: Faostat, 2009. 
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crops that account for much of this growth. NEPAD data 
shows that, while production levels of the smallholder 
sector had grown by only 3% in 2003, cash crop production 
increased approximately 41% as a result of the large 
investment in sugar, cotton, cashew nuts, tobacco and 
tea (NEPAD, 2004). Yields of some of these crops have 
been rising consistently (Figure 3). 
Sugar is the major exception, as the productivity 
records set during the colonial period still remain 
unsurpassed (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Yield per sugar hectare, 1961- 2009
Overall, agriculture continues to fail to meet its 
potential, especially with regards to reducing rural 
poverty.  A combination of factors has contributed to 
this under performance. These can be grouped into four 
categories:
(i)  Civil war. Two decades of civil war, which pitted the 
Frelimo government against the Renamo guerrilla, 
had a devastating effect on the rural areas and the 
agricultural sector dynamics, turning approximately 
4.7 million people into refugees and forcing about 
1.5 million refugees to be abandoned in neighbouring 
countries and thousands in urban areas (World Bank 
2005: 13), where there was no food and no chance 
to practice family farming (A. Dinermann, 1998).
(ii) Precarious technological and infrastructural 
conditions. Mozambique is characterized by a low 
application level of agricultural know-how and 
technology. The use of farm fertilizers is negligible, 
which keeps the average farm income at a low level 
(about 4kg/ha) and puts the country far below the 
continental average of 10 kg/ha and away from the 
goals proposed on the 2006 Abuja conference, which 
mandates fertilizer use in a 50 kg per hectare ration 
as a decisive measure for sustainable agricultural 
productivity (Hanlon, 2011). Productivity is also 
affected by limited access to and absorption of 
technology and extension services. In addition, the 
development of agro-ecological zones is constrained 
by weak infrastructures, both in terms of transport 
and communication infrastructures and in terms of 
supply facilities and irrigation structures (MINAG, 
2010). The distribution infrastructure is asymmetric 
across the country and the northern and central areas 
of the country, endowed with a great agricultural 
potential, are the most densely populated and where 
the production bulk of cash crops, including cotton, 
tobacco, sesame, sunflower, copra, tea and cashew 
(IFAD, 2008, MADER 2004, Wuyts 2001).5
(iii) Low level of public and private investment in the 
sector. Investments in the public and private sector 
experienced a significant decline in recent decades. 
Public expenditure in agriculture has declined from 
an average of 24% of total expenditure in the period 
of 1975 to 1986,6 to 10% in 1989 (Castel-Branco, 1994) 
and 4% in 2008 (GMD, 2009, USAID, 2009), thus 
placing the country currently below the 10% goal 
established in the Maputo Declaration of the African 
Union.  Data on private credit for the agricultural 
sector indicates that, between 2001 and 2008, the 
credit share fell from 18% to 8% and the sector has 
fallen from second to fourth place in the national 
sector ranking (Bank of Mozambique, 2009). Currently, 
it is estimated that about 60% of private investment 
in agriculture is focused on sugar and cotton.
(iv) Governance fragility. Weak governance capacity, 
characterized primarily by a top-down and 
administratively fragmented structure, coupled with 
an obsolete management system and poor technical 
capacity, were for decades important bottlenecks. 
In addition, the Mozambican state apparatus is still 
marked by elements of patrimonialism, where 
appointments and promotions are based on 
clientelistic ties and not on merit.  Some efforts have 
been made by the government, with donor support, 
to restructure and modernize the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA) and professionalize its staff. 
However, these efforts have, since 2005, when the 
new President took office, suffered some draw back. 
Instability in the political leadership of the agricultural 
sector has been feature of the new administration: 
between 2005 and 2010, four ministers have been 
appointed to lead MINAG.7 Replacement and/or 
marginalization of competent managers and 
technicians in favour of less competent ones, at both 
central and local levels, for ideological and political 
reasons8, has led to the gradual erosion of the 
Ministry’s technical expertise (Mosca, 2011). Policy-
making is also noticeably more politicized, with the 
direct intervention of the Presidency resource 
allocation decisions within the sector, outside 
institutionalised planning and consultation 
processes. 
 
This study examines the political motivations 
underlying governance of the agricultural sector in detail, 
and, in particular, the influence of the electoral agenda 
and the interests of the ruling elites in the formulation 
and implementation of agriculture policies. Before 
starting such analysis of the political economy of the 
agricultural sector, and in order to situate better the 
discussion, the main stages that agricultural policy has 
gone through in the post-Independence period are 
identified.
Source: Faostat
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2.3 Main stages of Mozambique’s 
agricultural policy
Agricultural policy in Mozambique has gone through 
at least four distinct phases since the declaration of 
independence in 1975. The first stage, from 1975 to 1986, 
was dominated by the socialist model of strong state 
intervention aimed at the social and cultural 
transformation of the peasants and the fixation of their 
productive and economic base in cooperatives and state 
enterprises. This model greatly penalized the smallholder 
sector, leading to a decline in marketed production and 
impairing domestic consumption. With most of the 
agricultural credit allocated to cooperatives and state 
farms, little support was given to the smallholder sector. 
Without funding, smallholder production, which 
comprised two of the main export crops (cotton and 
cashews) as well as most food crops sold in the domestic 
market (maize, cassava, rice and peanuts), declined 
significantly (Pitcher, 2002).
The second phase takes place between 1986/7 and 
1992 as was marked by the introduction of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme supported by the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Agricultural policies implemented in this 
period were not able to create considerable incentives 
for the dominant smallholder sector to serve as a 
foundation to leverage the industry. However, they 
contributed greatly to the recovery of the agricultural 
development model in the colonial period, consequently 
sidelining smallholder agriculture (Mosca, 2011; Castel-
Branco, 1994).
The third phase took place in the decade following 
the General Peace Agreement, between 1992 and 2002. 
In a context of a post-war collapsed state (Zartman, 
1995)9, the main concern of the ruling elites was to 
promote cash crops (such as cotton, tobacco, and sugar, 
which could be a source of government revenue through 
exports as well as providing an opportunity for rent 
extraction. 
These revitalisation of these crops was driven by 
privatisation measures adopted during the structural 
adjustment period and, in particular, the availability of 
foreign capital willing to invest on them (Mosca, 2011). 
Although the prioritisation of cash crops had an economic 
rationale, it also was driven by political motivations. The 
recovering of these cultures produced new alliances 
between foreign capital and the elites in power and 
contributed to the consolidation of Frelimo’s power over 
the economy, the state and rural space, much of which 
was under Renamo’s domination, the main opposition 
party (Pitcher, 2002). Furthermore, this policy contributed 
to the settlement in the local economy of demobilized 
soldiers and thousands of displaced families that began 
returning to their homelands.
The fourth phase, which begins in 2003 and extends 
roughly to the present day, coincides with the arrival to 
power of President Armando Guebuza. With Guebuza, 
there has been a vigorous promotion of the agricultural 
sector in the political discourse, focused on food 
production and the smallholder sector. The 2007 Green 
Revolution strategy and the 2008 Food Production Action 
Plan for Food Production (PAPA) provide an illustration 
of the paradigm shift in the sector. 
This paper focuses specifically on the third and fourth 
phases, looking at how agricultural policy has been used 
by the governing elites to, firstly, extract rents from the 
sector while neglecting the peasantry and then extend 
and consolidate their political clout across the rural 
sphere. To understand how agricultural policies have 
been used by political elites (section 4), one must bear 
in mind the configuration and dynamics of the political 
system of Mozambique (section 3).
3.  Political settlement, 
multiparty elections and 
configuration of the 
political system
This section analyzes the configuration of the 
Mozambican political system emerging from the political 
settlement underlying the General Peace Agreement, as 
well as the results of multiparty general elections held 
since then. This analysis provides the basis for 
understanding the political rationale influencing the 
Frelimo Government, which has shaped the design and 
implementation of agricultural policies.
3.1 Political settlement
Mozambique is one of the few countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa where the transition to democracy was the result 
of an internal conflict. In fact, the worsening of the civil 
war in Mozambique and international pressures forced 
the Maputo regime to approve a Constitution in 1990, 
which allowed, after signing the General Peace 
Agreements, to carry out the first free and multiparty 
elections in 1994.
The signing of the General Peace Agreements was not 
confined only to the end of hostilities agreement or the 
constitution of the Supervisory Committee for Peace 
established by the UN and the two forces that fought 
the war: the party in power, Frelimo10, and Renamo, the 
main opposition party. Two fundamental matters ensured 
peace and elections in 1994, namely: (i) the signature of 
a “UN-sponsored secret agreement between Joaquim 
Chissano11 and Afonso Dhlakama of unknown details” 
(Rosário, 200912), and (ii) the demobilization strategy for 
Frelimo and Renamo troops.
Concerning the secret agreement, it is argued that 
Dhlakama has accepted the role of “eternal leader of the 
opposition” in Mozambique in return for financial 
benefits, including $3 million provided by the United 
Nations for the transformation of the former Renamo 
guerrilla movement into a political party (Rosario, 2009). 
The demobilisation issue was sensitive for political and 
strategic reasons. In fact, the initial resistance of the two 
parties in laying their arms aside and call their soldiers 
Working Paper 034 www.future-agricultures.org7
back was directly linked to two factors: on the one hand, 
mutual distrust, and on the other, the fact that the military 
dimension still remains an important source of power in 
a non-institutionalized political environment (Rosario, 
2009). The ongoing negotiations between Chissano and 
Dhlakama on the integration of the Renamo military in 
the Mozambican Army Forces preserved the peace. 
However, this issue is still subject to discussion and 
debate between the Frelimo government and 
Renamo.
3.2.  The political system and relations 
between the legislative and executive 
powers
Although the representation system is proportional, 
the Mozambican political life is dominated by the two 
main actors of the civil war, Frelimo and Renamo. 
Furthermore, only Frelimo has been in power since 
Independence from Portugal. The bipartisanship 
produced in the 1999 and 2004 elections overrides the 
development of other political or social movements.. 
Nevertheless, on the 2009 elections, a small political 
party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), 
managed to elect nine members onto of the 250-member 
Parliament. However, in terms of discourse, manifest or 
policy practices, MDM does not represent an alternative 
as it does not distinguish itself from the two dominant 
parties (Chichava, 2010). The recent divisions and internal 
conflicts for power sharing at the level of MDM leadership 
and the absence of effort to work with the electorate, 
mostly urban and from Maputo, show the fragility of this 
movement in the national political arena. To be seen as 
an alternative to Frelimo and replace Renamo in the 
leadership of the opposition in Mozambique, MDM 
should take over the social basis of Renamo and become 
a well organized, structured and disciplined political 
“machine” with well trained and paid militants, able to 
resist the bribes offered by other parties (ibid). This 
situation is far from becoming a reality. The internal 
conflicts in recent months within the MDM parliamentary 
group and the weak influence it carries on legislative 
output show the weakness of this movement in 
Parliament. 
The Mozambican Parliament, or Assembly of the 
Republic, is the highest legislative body and has the 
authority to approve programs and Government plans, 
to produce legislation and perform other roles in the 
legislative sphere. Although the Constitution grants it 
this power, the legislative roles assigned to the President 
of the Republic contribute to the weakening of Parliament. 
The President holds the power of veto (Article 163 of the 
Constitution), the power of dissolution of Parliament 
(Article 159 of the Constitution), and the power to draft 
“Decree-Laws” (Article 181 of the Constitution).
The existence of an absolute majority of the ruling 
party in the four legislatures since the Peace Agreements, 
has shaped the relationship between the legislative and 
the executive branches of power. Party discipline means 
that, in general, there are no contradictions between the 
executive and Frelimo benches in Parliament. The 
solidarity that prevails between the majority in Parliament 
and Government has prevented a genuine policy debate, 
reducing Parliament to a secondary role (Brito et al., 
2003). The opposition’s minority position in Parliament 
systematically renders it unable to influence the legislative 
process, let alone Government’s action. The only arena 
where there is a basis for negotiation between the two 
main political forces in Parliament is when the 
constitutional revision is discussed, since this requires a 
majority vote of two thirds (ibid, 2003). It was on the 
basis of a Frelimo-Renamo consensus that a revised 
Constitution was approved in 2004. Recently, differences 
have been emerging over a constitutional amendment 
that is currently under consideration. While Frelimo and 
MDM are aligned towards the constitutional amendment, 
Renamo is showing signs of resistance to cooperate.
In the following sections, we make the case that 
electoral results have contributed to the reconfiguration 
of the domestic political space and the political 
exploitation of policy in matters concerning agriculture 
Table 3. Results of parliamentary and presidential 1994 elections, national and provincial levels
Province Dhlakama Chissano Outros Frelimo Renamo UD Others
C. Delgado 18.63 67.92 13.44 57.67 22.63 5.83 13.73
Niassa 26.90 56.53 16.53 46.27 32.77 6.19 13.71
Nampula 42.80 37.15 20.05 30.55 48.42 4.49 16.52
Zambezia 47.54 38.38 14.03 31.40 51.98 4.65 11.95
Tete 42.37 40.43 17.1 30.98 49.09 5.90 14.01
Manica 50.42 33.61 15.95 27.06 57.87 4.04 11.03
Sofala 73.48 17.53 8.98 14.21 75.86 1.48 8.27
Inhambane 10.36 78.44 11.19 59.43 12.92 11.72 15.85
Gaza 1.86 94.92 3.22 81.42 2.68 6.87 9.04
MaputoProvince 6.17 89.94 3.87 77.32 6.93 5.94 9.49
Maputo City 8.74 87.10 3.98 78.60 8.98 2.81 9.31
Total 33,73 53,30 11.66 44,33 37,78 5.44 12.45
Source: Mazula (1998), Mozambican statistics from the 1994 electoral process, Maputo.
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and local governance.  Agriculture and the rural sector 
have become a political priority, leading Frelimo to 
conceive strategies to seduce the rural electorate.
3.3.  First multiparty elections (1994) and 
the configuration of political forces
The 1994 elections were won by Frelimo with 44% of 
the votes against Renamo’s 38% (Table 3). Two types of 
divisions that characterize the Mozambican society were 
confirmed in these elections. On one hand, the rural/
urban divide: urban voters voted for Frelimo, while the 
rural population voted for Renamo 13. The rural population, 
mainly from the central and northern regions of the 
country, consisted of social groups that, for various 
historical and social reasons, had felt excluded by Frelimo 
(Cahen, 1997 and Brito, 1995). For example, the socialist 
project of Frelimo, and in particular the communal 
villages policy and the opposition to traditional practices 
such as polygamy and early marriage, was poorly received 
by rural communities.
Another division concerned ethnic and regional-based 
party support. In the 1994 elections, Frelimo won in 
Changana and Maconde areas, whereas Renamo was 
strongest in areas of Ndau, Sena, Shona and Macua 
influence. Dhlakama won relative majorities in the two 
most populous provinces, Zambezia (47.5%) and 
Nampula (42.8%), as well as in Manica and Tete, and 
obtained a stable absolute majority in Sofala (73.5%), all 
provinces in the central region. Chissano won majorities 
in the southern provinces, namely Gaza (94.9%), Maputo 
province (89.9%), Inhambane (78.4%) and Maputo city 
(87.1%), as well as the old bases of the areas liberated of 
the anti-colonial struggle, namely Cabo Delgado (67.9%) 
and Niassa (56.5%) in the north (Mazula, 1997). 
Communities in the south and the far north voted 
massively for Frelimo and these two regions are 
predominantly home to the Frelimo elites: the urban and 
intellectual elite of the south and the military elite of the 
north.
However, contrary to what many had thought, 
Renamo’s electorate was ethnically less concentrated 
than Frelimo’s (Cahen, 2000). The ethnic concentration 
of voting was most visible in areas where Frelimo won 
elections, with support from the Maconde people in the 
far north and the Machangana in the south (Cahen, 2000). 
Given the relatively small size of the Maconde ethnic 
group, the elections revealed Frelimo as essentially a 
party of the south.  In an attempt to expand its influence, 
Frelimo co-opted the elites of an important association 
from the North which constituted a threat to the central 
power, both as a protest movement against the regime 
and as a potential political force (Rosario, 2009; Chichava, 
2008). The elected President, Joaquim Chissano, 
appointed four prominent leaders of the Association for 
the Development of the Macua (ASSAN) for high 
government positions. This association had appeared 
shortly before the 1994 elections.14 Frelimo thus began 
the process of rebuilding the state and society according 
to its own interests.
The decentralization policy adopted after the elections 
also contributed to strengthening control over local 
threats. Law 3/94 provided for the transformation of old 
districts into urban and rural municipal districts with 
elected governments. However, given the electoral 
performance of Renamo in 1994, which had gained more 
than 50% of the votes in 61 out of 128 districts (with 
some stabilization in Manica, Zambezia, Nampula, Tete 
and Sofala), the law was subsequently changed, thanks 
to a Frelimo parliamentary majority, giving rise to a 
municipalization model restricted initially to 33 urban 
locations. Such decentralization policy adopted by 
Frelimo prevented about two thirds of the population, 
living outside cities or villages, from taking an active civic 
role though local elections, leaving them in a kind of 
“political informality”. To date, three municipal elections 
have been held (1998, 2003 and 2008) and all of them 
have been overwhelmingly won by Frelimo. Law 3/2008 
graduated 10 villages to the status of municipalities, 
which currently number a total of 43.
 Table 4.  Results of 1999 parliamentary and presidential elections, national and provinces total 
Province Dhlakama Chissano Frelimo Renamo UD Others
C. Delgado 33.5 66.5 62.3 26.9 1.3 9.5
Niassa 56.9 43.0 41.2 47.5 1.2 10.1
Nampula 55.8 44.2 39.2 44.0 2.0 14,8
Zambezia 70.4 29.6 26.1 59.5 1.5 12.9
Tete 59.6 40.4 37.2 49.5 1.6 11.7
Manica 66.0 34.0 32,0 56.9 1.5 9.6
Sofala 79.9 20.1 19,6 71.1 1.2 8.1
Inhambane 28.9 71.1 62,1 20.5 3.0 14.4
Gaza 4.8 95.2 87,4 3.5 0.7 8.4
Maputo Province 9.9 90.1 85.0 9.6 0.7 4.7
Maputo City 13.3 86.7 82.7 13.5 0.5 3.3
Total 47,71 52,29 48,54 38,81 1.3 9.77
Source: STAE. 2002. 1999 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, Maputo.
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3.4.  1999 elections and the growing 
awareness of the importance of the 
rural electorate
Despite Frelimo’s attempts to co-opt Macua elites, the 
1999 election results in the provinces inhabited by large 
segments of this ethnic group were not favourable to 
the government party but instead endorsed Renamo 
and its leader, Afonso Dhlakama (Table 4).
At the national level, Renamo’s votes grew from 37.8% 
to 38.8% of the electorate and Afonso Dhlakama’s from 
33.7% to 47.7%. In provinces where major population 
centres of Macua origin are located, Dhlakama improved 
his election results significantly: from 43.1% to 57.0% in 
Nampula province, from 47.6% to 71.8% in Zambezia, 
and from 27.3% to 57.0% in Niassa. Vast segments of the 
rural population voted for Renamo’s leader in order to 
express their dissatisfaction with the Maputo regime. 
Although shaken by internal and organizational problems, 
Renamo was able to use traditional authorities as 
intermediaries for the political mobilisation of the rural 
electorate. During this period, Frelimo had not yet made 
significant strides in its policy of régulo recovery (the 
traditional chieftains) and “to socially open up power”, 
despite some initial efforts (Dinnerman, 1998). Yet, 
despite the significant recovery of Dhlakama, the 
elections were won by Frelimo and Joaquim Chissano 
(with 48.5% and 52.3%, respectively). This victory was 
challenged by Renamo who accused the election of 
being fraudulent.15 Initially, Dhlakama refused to 
recognize the election results, but later authorized the 
Renamo members to take their seats in Parliament. 
3.5.  Agriculture as a power consolidation 
mechanism within the party 
The highly disputed and marginal victory by Chissano 
in 1999 shook the legitimacy of the leader within the 
party, eventually preventing him from running for 
re-election in the following elections. Hélder Muteia, 
agronomist and a new generation scholar of Frelimo, 
was the first to be indicated as potential successor to 
Chissano. Taking advantage of his status as Minister of 
Agriculture and as a Zambezia native, a province located 
in the centre of the country, Muteia used agriculture to 
consolidate and legitimize his position within the 
party. 
The rice production.16 campaign of 2001, launched a 
few months before the internal Frelimo elections, can 
be interpreted as a political point-scoring by the candidate 
to the leadership of the party in power The rice campaign 
was launched in the provinces of Gaza, Sofala, Zambezia, 
Nampula and Cabo Delgado and aimed to foster rice 
production and reduce the rice deficit through 
investments in irrigation infrastructure and the recovery 
of rice processing plants (Domingo, 2001). Provincial and 
district seminars were organized, where Muteia and 
peasant and traditional authorities associations 
participated to discuss ways to improve productivity and 
expand smallholder rice production (ibid). According to 
some interviewees, this campaign continued after 2004 
and eventually led to a proposed strategy for development 
of the rice crop sector in 2005. Its implementation did 
not produce the desired effects, not only due to the 
departure in 2005 of a large number of senior Ministry 
of Agriculture staff, but also because the sector began 
to be subject to strong political influence. The main 
agriculture policy priorities defined by the Chissano 
government were dropped in favour of new ones, namely 
the production of jatropha, a biodiesel crop.17
The issue of land privatization was another strategy 
used by Minister Muteia hoping to garner support amidst 
the new Frelimo elite. The Minister’s interview with the 
pro-government newspaper Domingo illustrates this 
clearly:
“I believe, as a minister, it is time to start 
discussing the creation of farm land markets, 
to discuss this and uphold a compatible 
approach with our reality. Our land law 
protects the peasant [and according to the 
debate on this law], there was a consensus 
between all farmers and civil society that it 
was best to protect the peasant, but I think 
the time has arrived to start selling land... 
(Domingo, July 8, 2001).
However, the second strategy triggered a reaction 
opposite to that the Minister expected, who ended up 
being harshly criticized within the party (Hanlon, 2002). 
At the July 2002 party congress, the following was 
noted:
“The policy of the Frelimo Party on farm 
lands is to ensure that the Mozambique 
people does not lose its most valuable 
resource -- the land, which holds, besides 
its economic value, a vital cultural dimension” 
(Frelimo, 2002)
The theses presented at the Eighth Frelimo Party 
Congress dealt a harsh blow to Muteia’s ambitions. The 
pressure exerted by this candidate and others of the new 
generation was not sufficient to impose a candidate of 
theirs in a party still dominated by veterans of the anti-
colonial struggle. The party’s internal elections were 
eventually won by Armando Guebuza, chosen as the 
lead candidate and a member of the Frelimo leadership 
since the days of the anti-colonial struggle, known for 
his organizational capacity as well as his obstinacy. 
Guebuza then began a major patronage thrust with 
religious overtones (Cahen, 2010) with the aim of 
capturing the rural electorate of the central and northern 
provinces of the country, until then a main support 
stronghold for Renamo. Guebuza paid special attention 
to the party foundations and the district administrators 
that historically constituted a fundamental link to territory 
and population control. In the following period, Frelimo’s 
strategy towards the electorate made a sharp turn, visibly 
manifested in the unfolding of the decentralization policy 
(an issue discussed in greater detail on section 4).
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3.6. 2004 elections and the Frelimo 
conquest of the rural electorate
The 2004 elections warranted Guebuza an 
unquestionable victory and, once again, to Frelimo (Table 
5). 
These elections proved the effectiveness of Frelimo’s 
strategy to conquer the rural electorate and confirmed 
Renamo’s political weakness, unable to secure support 
from its rural electorate.
Dhlakama lost more than 53% of his 1999 electorate. 
Dhlakama’s decline was noticeable throughout the 
country, while the Frelimo candidate suffered only a slight 
decline in Maputo city and province. While Dhlakama 
had managed to win over Chissano in six provinces in 
1999, he was only able to win three in 2004, and the 
results fell quite short of the ones achieved previously. 
With regard to legislative results, Renamo losses were 
devastating and spread across all provinces, including 
the populous provinces of Zambezia and Nampula where 
Renamo was hitherto firmly embedded. According to 
Sumich and Honwana (2007), the landslide victory of 
Frelimo in this election was ensured by the systematic 
use political patronage to secure support from Renamo 
constituencies, notably within the Northern and Central 
regions of Mozambique. 
This electoral defeat reflected the political weakness 
of Renamo and its failure to create an institutional 
apparatus that allowed it to retain its allies against the 
wealthy patronage of Frelimo’s central power (Rosario, 
2009). Renamo’s inability to propose a truly alternative 
programme and create a “different political culture” 
(Martin, 1988) reflects the fragility of its political 
organization. Renamo has not managed to fulfil its social 
representation function (Otayek, 1998). Although it was 
transformed into a political party, the influence of war 
veterans, who perceive political life as a military matter, 
is still very strong (Cahen, 2010). The recent statements 
by Dhlakama and other senior party members, who 
advocated the restoration of former military bases and 
a return to war to oust Frelimo from power, and install a 
new political order in Mozambique (Notícias, 2011, Canal 
de Moçambique, 2011) show that Renamo’s internal 
rational is still of a militarized nature. As one author stated, 
“Renamo is not a party, where initiatives are taken from 
a base-level, for local problems, and for the intermediate 
ranks for regional issues, but a party where each member, 
regardless of their own level, expects guidance “(Cahen, 
2010).
4. Discussion: political 
dimensions of 
government action in 
agriculture
4.1. Selective negligence of the 
agricultural sector in the Chissano 
era: the sugar case
The first multiparty elections of 1994 confirmed not 
only the legislative but also the executive power of the 
Frelimo party, in office since 1975. Frelimo’s political and 
ruling elite continued to hold control over the state 
without having to make any significant political 
concessions. This situation allowed it to secure a dominant 
place in the national economy through participation in 
privatized companies, thus strengthening its power over 
the economy and the country (Pitcher, 2002). This strategy 
of appropriating public resources for the benefit of the 
elites was also implemented in the agricultural sector, a 
key area for income generation, particularly with regard 
to commercial agriculture.  Initially, this appropriation 
was made by granting access rights to land and 
agricultural credit to the Frelimo elite, contrary to the 
essence of the Government’s agrarian policy drafted in 
1995. The Agricultural Policy and its Implementation 
Strategy have long been the reference instruments for 
State intervention on agriculture. On paper, the policy 
aimed to achieve food security, sustainable economic 
Table 5. Results of parliamentary and presidential 2004 elections, national and provincial levels
Province Dhlakama Guebuza Frelimo Renamo Others
C. Delgado 18.0 77.6 75.6 17,3 7.1
Niassa 28.3 67.3 66.4 27,0 6.6
Nampula 43.9 49.8 48.3 40.0 11.7
Zambezia 56.8 37.5 36.3 52.7 11.0
Tete 22.2 74.2 74,0 21.1 4.9
Manica 47.5 47.4 46,0 45.4 8.6
Sofala 68.5 26.0 25.6 64.9 9.5
Inhambane 10.6 83.6 77.2 9.9 12.9
Gaza 1.8 96.4 94.0 1.7 4.3
M. Prov. 8.6 89.3 85.8 8.8 5.4
M. City 12.9 85.2 81.9 13.6 4.5
Total 31.7 63.7 62.03 29.73 7.86
Source: STAE. 2006. 2004 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, Maputo. 
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development and reducing levels of absolute poverty 
by supporting smallholder agriculture, which held a 
central role in the income of most of the population 
(Birgegård, 2006). However, practice showed that 
commercial farming growth was the real priority of the 
ruling elites. At the 2002 Coordinating Council, Helder 
Muteia, the then Minister of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MADER), concluded that:
“While farmers are important, priority 
should be given to promoting the growth 
of commercial agriculture, as it should aim 
for an increase in productivity by making 
use of inputs and better market access.” 
(Demos, 2002).
The Minister considered that foreign direct investment 
(FDI) was the main engine of development and that 
“Government should facilitate this investment by 
providing land obtaining mechanisms and other 
opportunities” (Domingo, 2002). From this period onward, 
smallholder agriculture interests were neglected, and 
services for small farmers were confined to basic technical 
assistance on high commercial value crops such as 
tobacco, cotton, tea, sesame and sugar. 18  The Minister’s 
position was intrinsically linked to the fact that foreign 
investment in the sugar industry was, at the time, a 
successful endeavour, not only in terms of job creation 
in rural areas, but also by helping to lower sugar import 
for domestic consumption, which has previously created 
a large trade deficit (Notícias, August 9, 2000). According 
to then Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
foreign companies had invested until 2002 more than 
$300 million to recover the sugar industry and it was 
necessary to extend this experience to other crops in 
order to allow the agricultural sector to play its role as a 
major driver of  development (MADER, 2003). 
According to (Burr et al. 2011), however, the support 
given by the political leadership to the sugar industry 
rehabilitation resulted from the convergence of a number 
of elements, including: (i) the specific experience and 
ability of the national industry players in creating a local 
bureaucracy that could serve as an liaison between the 
interests of FDI and the government/state, (ii) the political 
pragmatism displayed on the 1992 General Peace 
Agreements, (iii) attributes of an ideological nature, and 
(iv) government needs to establish bureaucratic and state 
control over both territory and population.  Our analysis 
will focus on this last point. 
The focus on the sugar industry began in 1995 with 
the approval by the Council of Ministers of the Sugar 
Sector Development Policy and Strategy. The aim was 
to achieve the 1972 production levels, when about 325 
thousand tons of sugar were produced, 60% of which 
for export, and the sector was the largest formal workforce 
employer. The massive exodus of technicians, engineers 
and other qualified staff at independence and consequent 
disinvestment in what was seen as a strategic sector 
forced the state to nationalize the industry. As a result 
of the divestment and civil war, sugar production declined 
to about 13 thousand tons in 1992, forcing the country 
to rely on imports and smuggling from neighbouring 
countries (Burr et al., 2011). Sugar imports led to a 
significant drain of the country’s foreign currency 
reserves. In the 90s, Mozambique imported between 80 
and 100 thousand tons, thus creating a significant trade 
deficit (Notícias, April 18, 2011).
Four sugar farms were rehabilitated, namely Maragra, 
Xinavane, Mafambisse and Marromeu. By 2002, these 
four sugar companies employed nearly 20,000 people 
and their activities benefited local people and migrant 
workers (Burr et al., 2011). They also created further job 
opportunities through the national companies that 
emerged in the meantime to provide subsidiary services 
to the sugar farms and mills. (Notícias, July 7, 2003). Their 
activity therefore had a large impact and produced a 
multiplier effect in the regions where sugar mills had 
been established, by imbuing local economies with 
greater dynamics, thus becoming attracting poles for 
public and private investment (ibid).
Two of the four rehabilitated sugar farms (Maragra 
and Xinavane) are situated in the southern region of 
Mozambique, where, during the 1994 general elections, 
Frelimo and its candidate had obtained overwhelming 
majorities of over 95% (Mazula, 1997). The other two 
(Mafambisse and Marromeu) are located in the central 
region of Mozambique, strongly controlled by Renamo. 
During the civil war period, administration was exercised 
by traditional leaders nominated by Renamo (Pereira, 
1999). In light of the General Peace Agreements, which 
envisaged a dual administration situation, Renamo had 
appointed Marromeu as its administrator, who held 
power until after the 1994 elections, when the Frelimo-
state administration was in place.
During the electoral campaign for the 1999 elections, 
the Marromeu factory rehabilitation was used by the 
Frelimo candidate as propaganda.  Joaquim Chissano 
said:
“Over the next five years, we will work to 
fight unemployment [...]; we will resume 
sugar production in Maragra and Marromeu.  
Nothing should cause us to despair […]. My 
voice is raised because I will fulfilled my 
promises.” (Notícias, 25 October 1999) 
The revitalization of Marromeu had become an ace in 
the sleeve for the Frelimo government, as a way to secure 
and restore bureaucratic state control over the territory 
and local populations. The then Frelimo’s secretary-
general, Armando Guebuza, rejoiced at the impact of 
the sugar industry rehabilitation in Marromeu:
“... Operations of the Sena company provided 
employment to more than 7500 workers, 
mostly residents in the Marromeu district. 
In fact, there are improvements in road 
trafficability with the opening and 
maintenance of feeder roads, products and 
goods supply to commercial establishments 
as well as essential goods, advancements 
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in the teaching and learning activities, fresh 
water piping system, 24-hour electricity 
availability, among others [...].  The fight 
against absolute poverty in Marromeu is 
making tremendous positive strides...” 
(Notícias, August 2, 2003)
By providing employment and ensuring social 
investments in education and health, transportation and 
communication, the rehabilitation of the Marromeu 
sugar company allowed Frelimo to improve its 2003 
electoral results and to win the municipal assembly by 
50.2% of the votes against Renamo’s 49.8%.
In a context where there is only a slight difference 
between the Party and State realms, and where the 
presence and capacity of the State is notoriously weak, 
the choice of Marromeu for rehabilitation was a political 
and party strategy by Frelimo to implement State 
bureaucracy and control the population. The political 
exploitation of this rehabilitation project by foreign 
capital during the 2008 local elections and the 2009 
parliamentary elections allowed the state bureaucrats 
linked to the Frelimo party to obtain political gains (Canal 
de Moçambique, 2009). The Frelimo victory in the 2008 
local and presidential elections and the 2009 
parliamentary election confirms this perspective. In fact, 
Frelimo and its candidate won the 2008 local elections 
in Marromeu.  For the 2009 general election, Guebuza 
and Frelimo won over Renamo and Dhlakama with a 
landslide.
Frelimo’s strategy of broadening its rural areas 
constituencies
The approval of the Local Government Act (LOLE) in 
2003 (Law 8/2003) changed the relationship between 
the central government and the different hierarchy 
levels of the local government. LOLE introduced the 
integrated structure principle and eliminated the 
double subordination principle and spawned a series 
of participatory institutions and communitarian 
consultation devices (local consultative councils)19 aimed 
at the integration of local communities in the decision-
making process. In 2005, the LOLE Regulation (Decree 
11/2005) was approved and the district emerged as the 
locus of local development. The Supplemental Local 
Initiative Investment Budget (OIIL) was established to 
finance district development projects. Seven million 
Meticais were allocated to each district of the country, 
regardless of its population or needs. According to the 
official discourse, this fund contributed to finance of 494 
thousand farming and small industry projects, as well as 
to strengthen the monitoring capacity of public funds 
by local government, created 260 thousand new jobs 
and, consequently, contributed to poverty reduction 
(Cuereneia, 2010).
However, recent studies show that the OIIL availability 
to local communities did not produce any tangible results 
in terms of development of smallholder agriculture or 
the local small-scale agricultural processing industry 
(ACS, 2009; Forquilha, 2009, MINAG, 2008). Among the 
reasons given for its poor performance are the fact that 
projects financed by the fund were disconnected from 
the central government plans, especially since the district 
agriculture offices (SDAE) were not involved in their 
design and implementation (MINAG, 2008). An illustration 
of this has been the persistent difficulties in managing 
and maintaining irrigation schemes, as well as some 
shortcomings in the use of newly built/rehabilitated 
dams in the scope of this fund, (MINAG / DNSA, 2009). 
The fund has contributed, however, to further Frelimo’s 
reputation in rural areas that were once under the 
influence of Renamo (Forquilha, 2007), in a context of a 
dominant party system (Carothers, 2002) where there is 
a weak distinction between the state and the party 
spheres. A comparison of election results in the provinces20 
of Central and Northern Mozambique in 1999 and 2009 
shows that there is a gradual expansion of Frelimo in 
areas under influence of Renamo (Table 6).  
It has been argued that a private appropriation of the 
State sphere by the ruling party has been taking place 
Table 6. Comparison of election results in the 1999-2009 period
Provinces Frelimo Renamo
J. Chissano A. Guebuza A. Dhlakama
1999 2004 2009      1999 2004 2009
Niassa 43,0 67,3             82,3 57,0 28,3 12,7
C. Delgado 66,0 77,6 80,8 34,0 18,0 13,4
Nampula 43,0 49,8  66,8            57,0 44,0 27,4
Zambezia 28,2 37,5  54,3            71,8 56,8 38,8
Tete  40,2 74,2 86,0 59,8 2,2 0 8,8
Manica 34,0 47,4  70,4 66,0 7,5 22,2
Sofala 20,0 26,1  51,6             09,9 8,5 22,5
Source: Stae, 2002 & Stae, 2006
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with the use of public resources in the service of the 
party’s agenda (Forquilha, 2011). The use of OIIL in 
promoting agriculture, a sector which provides the 
livelihood of most rural households, illustrates a 
neo-patrimonial resource distribution logic based on 
political party membership. In this sense, OIIL has become 
a tool of political differentiation on a local level, a resource 
for granting legitimacy to political and administrative 
elites, and, most likely, an obstacle to the poverty 
reduction process (Forquilha, 2009). The way resources 
are distributed to the local level is not intended to create 
support infrastructures or to strengthen the productive 
capacity of small peasant families, but to strengthen and 
consolidate local elite groups with the capacity to 
produce, expand, and feed major projects taking place 
in the cities21 It also serves to eliminate the persisting 
local opposition against the ruling party and thus 
consolidate its hegemonic position at all levels of the 
state.  Local governance legislation and the OIIL were 
also used to capture traditional chieftains.
 
The “war” of traditional authorities
Although Laws 2/97 and 8/2003 provide for the 
coordination between municipal governments, local 
governments and community-level authorities, in 
compliance with the Constitution of the Republic, the 
relationship among these institutions and with the 
central government is far from consolidated. Control and 
influence over community-level authorities has been the 
subject of dispute between Frelimo and Renamo. 
Historically, the alliance with the chieftains, “rightful 
owners of the land” in rural areas, had been part of 
Renamo’s political tactics for the areas it had occupied 
during the Civil War period. The recovery of lost land and 
power exercise by traditional authorities was an important 
element in the development of local agriculture in 
traditional ways22 and not in ways that had been imposed 
by the Frelimo government during the period of socialism 
(collectivization).
Starting in 1990, and in a situation of pluralism and 
political competition, the Frelimo government, in an 
attempt to extend the authority of the state (and the 
party) to areas formerly occupied by the rebel movement, 
seeks to appropriate traditional authorities in order to 
fortify its local alliances. The approval of Decree 15/2000 
on community authorities illustrates the importance of 
such alliance. But the religious and political onslaught 
of Frelimo towards the achievement of traditional 
authorities had started earlier, soon after the electoral 
defeat of Frelimo in rural areas of central and northern 
Mozambique in the 1994 elections (Cahen, 2010). In 
October 1995, a government-sponsored meeting in 
Nampula province gathered all traditional authorities, 
religious leaders and chiefs in the country with the aim 
to discuss, in the words of President Chissano, the “state 
and future of traditional authorities in the new political 
administration” (Government of Nampula, 1995).
These alliances reflect the use of political patronage, 
conceived as a strategy for attainment, maintenance and 
enhancement of political power by employers, and by 
customers, for the protection and promotion of their 
interests (Forquilha, 2007). Some of the traditional 
authorities have, for example, been involved in the 
collection of local taxes and management community 
forests, which has not only contributed to the increase 
in local revenues but also for their personal income. The 
strategy for using of traditional authorities as brokers 
between voters and political parties at the local level 
seems to have been won by Frelimo, with Renamo failing 
to retain their clients. Given the socio-political situation, 
for some traditional leaders, support for Renamo 
produced little return, not only in material terms but also 
in political terms. In fact it was the approximation to 
Frelimo, through the State, which could be most 
rewarding. Hence the change in political alliances for 
some important chiefs. In the agricultural domain, one 
of the most significant examples of the advantages 
gained by traditional leaders is their inclusion in the 
process of management and control over land use, as 
well as their supervisory role on natural resource use 
based on local customs and traditions (Celestino, 
2001).
The Zambezi Valley
Implicit in the broad proposals on agriculture and rural 
development presented by Frelimo and Guebuza in the 
election manifesto for the 2004 elections was the Office 
for the Development of the Zambezi Valley (GPZ) and 
the political benefits this massive agricultural 
development project could generate. Created by Council 
of Ministers Decree 40/95 in August 22, the GPZ occupied 
an area of 225,000 Km2 (about 28% of the Mozambique 
area), with a population of 3,755,000 inhabitants (25% 
of the Mozambican population at the time) and 56% of 
the population in the provinces of Sofala, Manica, Tete 
and Zambezia. This project aimed to enhance the 
development of agriculture, forestry, livestock, fisheries 
and local processing of production destined for the 
domestic market. The personalized, discretionary and 
authoritarian management of this project by a war 
veteran, who used his political influence with central 
government to override provincial governments, is seen 
as one of the factors that contributed to the failure of 
the project (Savana, 2005). 
Since 2003, when Guebuza took over the presidency 
of Frelimo, the GPZ became one of the institutions that 
received more money from the state. A report produced 
by NEPAD shows that the total agriculture expenditure 
between 1998 and 2002, excluding debt service payment, 
was 5% of the total state budget. In 2003, this figure had 
risen to 8% due to the inclusion of GPZ in the section on 
agriculture and rural development (NEPAD, 2004). In 
2004, GPZ was awarded approximately 6 million U.S. 
dollars. The largest share was used for the purchase of 
tractors, seeds and other agricultural consumables that 
were distributed to farmers from the districts of Tete 
(Angónia, Tsangano, Mutarara), Zambezia (Morrumbala, 
Mopeia, Chinde, Milange, Mocuba, Maganja da Costa, 
Nicoadala, Inhassunge and Quelimane), Sofala, 
(Gorongosa, Marínguè, Chemba, Caia, Marromeu, 
Cheringoma and Muanza) and Manica (Báruè, Guro, 
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Table 7: 1999 and 2004 election results in the districts benefited by actions taken 
under the GTZ
TETE
District Renamo
A. Dhlakama
1999
Frelimo
J. Chissano
1999
Renamo
A. Dhlakama
2004
Frelimo
A. Guebuza
2004
Angónia 68,94 20,03 49,62 32,85
Mutarara 74,79 15,27 48,83 35,09
Tsangano 68,73 19,30 13,06 75,23
MANICA
District Renamo
A. Dhlakama
1999
Frelimo
J. Chissano
1999
Renamo
A. Dhlakama
2004
Frelimo
A. Guebuza
2004
Barué 50,01 40,70 32,47 58,00
Guro 58,78  32,47 29,27 59,33
Macossa 82,07 10,64 68,65 22,40
Tambara 72,50 15,58 44,40 36,52
SOFALA
District Renamo
A. Dhlakama
1999
Frelimo
J. Chissano
1999
Renamo
A. Dhlakama
2004
Frelimo
A. Guebuza
2004
Caia 81,01 08,62 74,76 14,75
Chemba 82,01 06,45 68,25 16,94
Cheringoma 86,02 08,92 62,86 22,82
Gorongosa 65,68 15,58 23,36 33,06
Marromeu 67,62 23,21  61,03 27,40
Maringué 84,09 04,58 61,01   28,69
Muanza 91,77 04,51 72,76 19,58
ZAMBÉZIA
District Renamo
A. Dhlakama
1999
Frelimo
J. Chissano
1999
Renamo
A. Dhlakama
2004
Frelimo
A. Guebuza
2004
Chinde  43,18 41,22 42,91 43,85
Inhanssunge 39,54 47,40 34,46 49,36
Mag. da Costa 58,72 23,58 45,67 33,41
Milange  75,29 10,36 66,29 16,15
Mocuba 57,91 30,29 45,18 42,74
Mopeia 61,30 28,71 51,01 35,81
Morrumbala 73,21 15,17 65,62 22,66
Nicoadala 53,32 32,35 46,10 36,58
Quelimane 53,01 39,93 48,04 43,30
Sources: STAE (2002) and STAE (2006)
Working Paper 034 www.future-agricultures.org15
Tambara and Macossa) before the elections of 2004 
(Savana, 2005, STV 2011 and key informant interview).23 
There is a coincidence here. Almost all districts listed as 
prioritary had voted massively for Renamo in the 1999 
elections (Table 7). This suggests that agriculture was 
used by the Frelimo government as an instrument to 
capture the rural Renamo electorate. The 2004 election 
results confirm this. In the Tete province, of the three 
districts covered by this project, Angónia, Tsangano and 
Mutarara and that had always previously (1994-1999) 
voted for Renamo, Tsangano shifted its support to Frelimo 
and Angonia and Mutarara continued to vote for Renamo 
in the presidential elections, but with very weak relative 
majority.
4.3. Populism in the context of 
international food price crisis: the 
case of Food Production Plan
In a context where politics plays a key role in priority 
setting for agricultural policies and where there is limited 
debate among key stakeholders, Guebuza’s arrival in 
power in 2005 did not change initially the political 
rhetoric on the prioritization of the agricultural sector 
as an engine for development and poverty reduction. 
However, the global food price crisis in 2007 and the 
sharp rise in fuel prices led the government to conceive 
a set of measures aimed at increasing national agricultural 
production, particularly through the Plan of Action for 
Food Production, 2008 (PAPA). 
The PAPA aimed to eliminate the national deficit for 
major food crops such as wheat and rice, in order to 
reduce dependence on imports (CEDIMO, 2009), and 
cassava, potatoes, oilseeds (sunflower and soybeans), 
considered vital to the Mozambican household 
consumption (MINAG, 2009). It has been argued, however, 
that the program was put in place mainly to raise external 
funds and consolidate the political space of Guebuza 
and the ruling elite (Mosca, 2011).
In order to show Government’s commitment towards 
PAPA, the 2008/09 agricultural campaign was officially 
launched across the country under the very visible 
leadership of the President and Provincial Governors. 
The implementation of PAPA has involved rehabilitating 
small irrigation systems and supplying various agricultural 
inputs and improved seeds to farmers in selected districts. 
With the aim of increasing local wheat production, for 
example, prioritary districts were selected to benefit from 
the programme’s assistance: Tsangano (Tete), Manica and 
Sussundenga (Manica), Lichinga, Lago, Sanga and 
Muembe (Niassa), Xai-Xai (Gaza) and Manhiça (Maputo). 
Wheat seeds were imported and distributed to selected 
family farmers, including 874 tonnes for the 2008/09 
season and 1860 tonnes for the 2009/10 season (MINAG/
DNSA, 2010).
However, the discourse of fostering local wheat 
production to reduce imports proved to be mainly 
retoricall and did not produce any tangible results. On 
the one hand, the areas chosen lacked the agro-ecological 
conditions for successful wheat production. On the other 
hand, goververnment’s management of the process 
failed to consider post-harvest and marketing issues. In 
fact, the few farmers who ventured into wheat production 
in these districts failed to find a domestic market for their 
produce and have intead turned to Malawi (Savana, 
2011). According to MINAG, in 2010 the wheat deficit 
was still high (469,500 tons)24 and not that significantly 
lower than the deficit recorded in 2008 (537.113 
tons).25
In addition, production indexes for most prioritary 
crops have not changed and the introduction of fertilizers 
has not improved the situation in any significant way. 
According to MINAG, in 2004 only 2% of farmers used 
fertilizers. This rose to only 3% with the implementation 
of PAPA (Eurossis, 2010). Lack of support for the risks that 
small farmers incur when the state does not guarantee 
the sale of surplus or non-subsidized fertilizers is one of 
the reasons behind the failure (ibid).
The choice of priority districts for the implementation 
of the PAPA reveals, in fact, an electoral motivation. The 
selected districts26 are those that, despite the efforts of 
the GPZ (as mentioned above), continued to vote for 
Renamo in 2004. With the abolition of the GPZ in 2005, 
it became necessary for the Frelimo government to create 
mechanisms to continue distributing rents to secure the 
electorate. The extent to which PAPA will continue to be 
such mechanism is under question, as difficulties of 
administrative and financial nature are threatning 
implementation (MINAG / DNSA, 2009). Provinces and 
districts lack the funds necessary to ensure the handling 
and distribution of large amounts of seeds distributed 
by the programme (ibid, 2009). The funds allocated by 
the government are insufficient and the programme is 
highly dependent on aid provided mainly by the World 
Bank and the European Union.27
According to some authors, such aid will produce 
perverse political effects as it will help to support the 
party in power and harm the political competition by 
increasing the importance of donors in the policy-making 
process (Brito, 2010; Hanlon and de Renzio, 2007). The 
biggest political problem posed by international aid is 
that it tends to reduce the level of “accountability” of 
government to the citizens, instead focusing on 
accountability to the donors (Brito, 2010). In an alliance 
with foreign capital (donors), Frelimo determines 
agricultural policy according to their interests. While 
these funds are not released, the PAPA is reduced to being 
a political project of the ruling elites to increase the 
dependency of the family sector. According to (Mosca, 
2011), PAPA lacks a truly developmentalist motivation, 
but is used by the elite in power to suit its own political 
interests and also to attract additional external resources 
from donors.
It is worth also noting that the PAPA experience also 
brings to light a change in governance style and in the 
role of the state in the economy. Recent government 
policies for agriculture unequivocally reveal a more 
interventionist state, justified by government as result 
of the need to achieve concrete results in terms of 
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production and income generation in prioritary districts. 
The direct intervention of the President himself in 
agricultural policy making through the Open Presidency 
(intense schedule of visits by the President to districts 
and local administrative posts) is illustrative. In its last 
Open Presidency, Guebuza visited 44 district headquarters, 
29 administrative positions, 17 towns, five cities and two 
villages, most of which were former Renamo strongholds 
during the Civil War. This governance mechanism has 
raised some controversy, not only for being considered 
a manifestation of populism by Guebuza with an electoral 
character, but also because it is thought to encourage a 
“top-down” governance logic which jeopardizes the 
development of independent governance institutions 
at a local level (Leininger , 2011). by Mozambican 
hands.”(Diário de Moçambique, 24 June 2011)
5. Conclusion
This paper aimed to analyse why agriculture in 
Mozambique has failed to emerge as a driver of 
development and poverty reduction, despite its untapped 
potential and the fact that it has been consistently 
prioritised by political discourse since the Independence. 
Various factors mentioned throughout the text explain 
why the sector has as a whole misperformed, with some 
specific exceptions. This study focused on political 
economy factors and examined how the policy-making 
process in agriculture has been constrained by the private 
interests of ruling elites and Frelimo’s electoral agenda.
Peace and political competition have failed to improve 
the agricultural sector’s performance in Mozambique in 
any significant way. Despite the introduction of free 
multiparty elections in 1994, todays’s political context is 
characterised by a strong dominance of the executive 
over the legislative system, the blurring between state 
and the Frelimo-government and the growing political 
and institutional weakness of the main opposition party. 
This paper illustrates how in this context, the policies 
adopted (in agriculture and local governance) have 
served as a mechanism to pursue the political and 
economic interests of the ruling elite of Frelimo. 
There are differences, however, between the strategies 
adopted by the two post-war leaders of Frelimo in this 
process.  Chissano’s leadership focused on co-opting 
certain social segments that could threaten government 
stability (narrow selectorate), leading, in agriculture, to 
a policy of selective neglect. Guebuza’s leadership, by 
contrast, and especially since 2005, opted for a more 
populist strategy (broader selectorate), particularly with 
the rural electorate from the Central and Northern 
Mozambique. The introduction of OIIL in 2005 and PAPA 
in 2008 were the most significant policies adopted under 
the Guezuza leadership with an impact on agriculture. 
The Open Presidencies were used as a mechanism to 
connect the President and Frelimo with the rural 
electorate. 
These policies and mechanisms reinforce the economic 
dependence of the peasantry on the state and the 
Frelimo party. The neglect by the Frelimo political elites 
of the agricultural sector, which provides the livelihood 
to about 70% of the rural population, is related to their 
social structure and their historical links to the tertiary 
sector and complete detachment from the dynamics of 
rural life and peasant production. The rethorical focus 
on agriculture by politicians serves as a mechanism to 
strengthen and legitimize the political domination of 
Frelimo’s southern elite.
There is however the issue of the sustainability of the 
existing policy strategy in the medium to long term. 
Renamo’s discontentment is visible and recent public 
addresses by the Renamo leader threaten to break the 
“political settlement” which emerged from the Peace 
Agreements. Dhlakama recently said:
“(...) Chissano was a man committed to 
dialogue and peace, unlike Guebuza, who 
is only concerned with personal business. 
[...] Chissano has always struggled for peace 
for the people of Mozambique, despite 
some mistakes that were often the problem 
of his decision-making government system 
[...] Guebuza is not concerned with the 
country’s development or political stability 
or with ensuring peace in Mozambique. [...] 
Guebuza leaves no room for dialogue on 
the problems the people of Mozambique 
is facing ... “(Savana, May 20, 2011)
And, on the threat to political stability:
“We have the necessary military and human 
means, we have thousands of supporters 
and we are prepared for this unconventional 
war [...] The men of my party, especially 
demobilized soldiers, are just waiting for an 
order to act.” (Canal de Moçambique, March 
31, 2011)
Are these threats credible and could they endanger 
the climate of peace? Or will the expansion of patronage 
networks in rural areas ensure the continuity of the 
current elite in power and the perpetuation of peasantry’s 
dependency?
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End Notes 
1  The other countries are: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Rwanda and Tanzania.
2  It ranks eighth on the 20 poorest countries in the world and 
197th out of 210 in the per capita level of income world ranking 
(World Bank, 2010).
3 Mosca (2011) argues that Mozambique is instrumentally 
presented as a success story by donors wanting to
 demonstrate the validity of their work and obtain political gains 
from it.
4 Calculations done by the author from data obtained, (MINAG/
DNSA, 2010). Preliminary Evaluation Report of the agricultural 
Campaign 2009/2010, Maputo.
 5 M. M. Wuyts, 2001, also states that during the colonial period, 
agro-ecology and economic dynamics dictated some regional 
specialization. Thus, in the northern area, sisal, cotton and 
tobacco were the dominant crops; in the central region, copra, 
tea and potatoes, and in the South, sugar and rice. In parallel, 
there was also a specialization between the two sectors, where 
food crops were typically produced by the peasant class.
6  Between 1978 and 1982, only 10% of all agricultural investment 
was made on small farmers and 90% went to state enterprises, 
mainly for the purchase of equipment, fertilizers and pesticides 
(Coughlin, 2006).
 7 Tomas Mandlate (2005-2007); Erasmo Muhate (2007-2007); 
Soares Nhaca (2008 – 2009) and José Pacheco (2010-2011).
8 For example, Helder Muteia, Minister of Agriculture of the last 
Joaquim Chissano administration (1999-2004), may have been 
removed from the Cabinet for being one of the competitors 
in the internal elections of the Frelimo party in opposition to 
current President Armando Guebuza.
9 Mozambique has emerged from the war in a state of total 
chaos. Approximately one million people had been killed (25% 
of the medical staff in rural areas) and many infrastructures 
had been destroyed. According to Mosca (1999), UNICEF 
estimated that war-related economic losses between 1980 and 
1985, approximated $5.5 billion - equivalent to three years the 
value of domestic product. The Government did not control 
the space outside the capital and communications within the 
country were made only by airplane. The Army was fragmented 
and national security depended largely on the Zimbabwean 
troops who guarded only strategic points.
10 Frelimo was funded in 1962 to fight for independence from 
Portugal. In 1977, after the Independence, it became a political 
party with a Marxist-Leninist influence. Renamo is a conservative 
party that opposed Communism and initially benefited from 
Ian Smith’s Rhodesia support.
11 Joaquim Chissano was the second leader of Frelimo and the 
one who signed the peace agreements, along with Afonso 
Dhlakama, leader of Renamo until today.
12 Interview made by the author with Aguiar Mazula on May 17, 
2009, and with Raul Domingos, 19 june 2011.
13 According to official statistics in 1994, approximately 65% of 
the Mozambican population and 80% of the poor population 
lived in the rural areas.
14 It had been the first time that a civic association was created 
to bring together the Macuas, the largest and most homogenous 
ethnic Mozambican group. Its legalization showed that there 
was a sense of ethnic revitalization between the Macuas.
15 It is speculated that Dhlakama may indeed have won the 
elections. Many of the ballots of the central and northern 
provinces, where Renamo held a strong foothold, were not 
accounted for (Cahen 2000 and Carter Center – www.
cartercenter.org).
16 Most of the rice production is done in the central region of the 
country (62%), followed by the northern region (31%) and the 
south has only 7% of the total production. According to 
(Cepagri, 2011), there is a correlation between poverty -  stricken 
areas (center) and rice crops. This shows that a rice crop 
development strategy was important for reducing poverty in 
the country.
17 Interview with R. de Sousa, June 11 2011.
18 Interviews with Ragendra de Sousa (June 2011) and Carlos 
Castel-Branco (July 2011).
19 According to MAE, the number of District Advisory Councils 
grew from 50 in 2005 to 128 district advisory councils, 389 
councils of administrative post, and 1042 local post ensuring
20 Interview with Castel-Branco, 2011
21 Community participation in planning and economic and social 
development and in the decision- making on the 
implementation of the investment and local initiative budget. 
See MAE, MAE Presentation to cooperation partners, Maputo, 
January 2009
22 The use of traditional authorities as agents of the colonial state 
to organize compulsory crops in regions where there was a 
strong cash crop production by controlling the distribution 
and use of land, input distribution, marketing control, created 
a hostile situation between them and the elite who came to 
the Frelimo leadership, from 1970 onwards. One reason for the 
hostility towards the chieftains was related to the Frelimo elite’s 
own socio- historical background, since they mostly came from 
the urban areas of Lourenço Marques and Maputo and were 
composed of young educated urban and small urban groups. 
The Frelimo’s elite background was completely opposed tothe 
socio- historical background of most traditional chieftains, most 
of whom were illiterate and with little contact with the urban 
world. As an author stated, the native segregation implemented 
by the colonial regime increased the distance between civilized 
(white, mestizos and assimilated) and the natives and, 
consequently, the former knew very little about the world of 
the latter and vice versa (Geffray: 1988). Moreover, many 
leaders of Frelimo came from.
23 Interview with Sérgio Vieira.
24 MINAG/DNSA, 2010.
25 Calculation of the author from MINAG/DNSA/DCAP (2009) 
Preliminary evaluation of the Plan of Action for the Production 
of Foods, Maputo. ntos, Maputo
26 These districts are: Angónia, Tsangano and Macanga in Tete; 
Caia, Gorongosa and Maringué in Sofala; Barué in Manica; and 
Chinde, Maganja da Costa, Milange, Mocuba, Mopeia, 
Morrumbala and Nicoadala in Zambezia
27 The actual weight of international aid is even more important 
considering that other direct budget supporting measures and 
many sector projects are funded by bilateral donors, besides 
the other funds injected by foreign and domestic NGOs. 
According to J. Hanlon and Renzio, it is likely that there are 
projects with more than 60 bilateral and multilateral donors, 
including UN agencies, NGOs and 150 international non- 
governmental organizations throughout Mozambique. 
Currently, the majority of aid
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